On the sixtieth anniversary of Aberfan (21 October 1966): a crime of the powerful?

 

Dedicated to the people of Aberfan

 Aberfan: at 9.15 am on 21 October 1966 a coal tip slid down the valley into the village killing one-hundred-and-sixteen children and twenty-eight adults (McLean & Johnes, 2018). Their public memorials are their gravestones, and a plaque. Out of respect, and mindful of the sixtieth anniversary, this essay eschews the language of “victims” and “disasters “ to honour both the dead and living citizens of Aberfan, (King, 2025).

 

There had been warnings: Tip Four in 1944 under the Powell Duffryn Company and Tip Seven in 1963 under the National Coal Board (NCB). Tip Seven was being used until 20 October 1966. Davies established the NCB had no clear tipping policy and managers lacked appropriate technical qualification (Davies, 1967: P33ff). Aberfan is an ontology of social-harm, a nexus where all four key indicators of Canning and Tomb’s (2021) social-harm-framework meet Sutherland’s (1940) inheritance. It was a crisis of left-wing patriarchy  – “a Labour Government, a Labour Council, a Labour Nationalised Coal Board” (Johnes, 2000:1), a trilogy of mistakes leading to an avoidable deluge. In the patriarchal boy’s-club clear-up operation that followed no one man took the blame. The multiple layers of harm identified by Canning and Tombs (2021:33) were carried by the mothers of the village and their descendants. The citizens of Aberfan carry generational scars codified in the language of Davie’s Report.

 

When Sutherland said that “white-collar crimes violate trust and therefore create distrust” (1940:12) it is ironic the class-based approach to white-collar crimes he delineates aptly applies to the management of coal-tips in 1966 Aberfan.  A point echoed by Croall with equal irony in her apposite discussion of “corporate killing” (Croall 2001:117-9). Reiman unpacks Sutherland’s assertion that laws are “written, administered and implemented” by the people who will not be punished by them (1979:129). Tombs and Whyte in turn see Reiman offering a Marxist response to Sutherlands class-based understanding of criminal justice (Coleman et al., 2009:104). No manager is blamed for Aberfan: while the children of the pit-workers die. In Tombs (2020) article on State-Corporate-Crime and Grenfell Tower he argues, cogently, that the homes of the tower’s residents become the site of State-Corporate violence.  The Powell Duffryn Company, and the NCB, failed Aberfan’s citizens, thus qualifying for the terms of state-corporate-crime. Arguably Michalowski and Kramer agree (2010). Before looking at those in power, this essay avers that Tomb’s defence of the residents of Grenfell Tower, is offered as an oblation for the citizens of Aberfan.

 

At no point did the Government abdicate patriarchal power – at every turn they are in control. The Government acted swiftly – issuing the commissioning warrant under the Tribunal Act (1921) five days later . They appoint three men and decide who is the Chair.  The Tribunal decides to meet in public and give witnesses the freedom to testify in Welsh (Davies 1967:5). As the 1921 Act did not make this provision, the Secretary of State gave the Tribunal power to fund legal expenses and travel costs for witnesses (Davies 1967:7). McLean and Johnes (2000) say that Davie’s Report was an excellent exercise in establishing the facts. Davies says the NCB refused to acknowledge the presence of underwater streams below the tips, holding out on this to Day 74 of the Tribunal.

 

The Government initiated a national tip review and a reorganization of the NCB from five to three layers of management. The Government accepted the recommendations of the Report (HC 751:C1912). Including the National Pit Safety Committee and the Mines and Quarries (Tips) Act (1969). But no-one individual was blamed and no one was asked to resign. “The disaster could and should have been prevented” (Davies, 1967:18). The crucial issue of the water springs is well documented in the Report, as is the key engineering issue of flow-slides (Davies 1967:271ff and 276).

 

Are the citizens of Aberfan an “ideal victim”? Duggan’s (2018) curated set of essays  demonstrate the painful paradox that, despite this essay’s intention, the citizens of Aberfan are delineated in many of the key characteristics of Christie’s seminal work.  The key omission is that the “offender” in this scenario, the NCB, is known to the good citizens of Aberfan: though arguably simultaneously not known. Tomb’s (2020) invoked Engel’s (1845) language of “social murder” to describe the events of the Grenfell Tower fire. Tombs argued convincingly, in both film and text, that Engel’s evocative imagery applies to the residents of the Tower during, and after, the 2017 fire. Engels wrote “The bourgeoisie dare not speak the truth in these cases… English working-men call this ‘social murder’, and accuse our whole society of perpetuating this crime perpetually” (1845:45). Before looking at primary voices, this essay contends Engel’s and Tomb’s words are painful epitaphs for the citizens of Aberfan.

 

Austen (1967) undertook an important and accurate exercise in providing eyewitness accounts. A commendation endorsed by Margaret Thatcher MP in the Parliamentary debate on the Report (HC 751: C1992). The “Aberfan Disaster Fund” was registered with the Charity Commission in 1967 having raised £1.75M from ninety-thousand donations. The Charity Commission approved Government intervention to transfer £150K from the fund to pay for tip safety works (McClean & Johnes, 2000). The Charity Commission and the NCB argued over the figures: £300 per dead child. McLean’s work demonstrates that while the Trustees of the fund are the Members of Merthyr Tydfil County Borough Council, the Government in reality, through the agency of the Charity Commission exercised excessive operational control. Before looking at secondary voices, this essay regrets Davie’s report struggled to give voice to the citizens of Aberfan.

 

The State commissions reports and through them exercises power. Academics write reports and through them also exercise power. The citizens of Aberfan, and their descendants, write poetry and music, and struggle for a voice for their individual and collective pain. The village gets a community centre, and a magnificent municipal cemetery. Each significant anniversary brings doleful verse and music. For the 50th anniversary Siersema (2016) curated a montage of verse and music commissioned for the year: this is how future generations will give voice to Aberfan. Morris’s reflection on the 50th anniversary of 1966 in Aberfan highlights the painful challenges that will confront journalists in 2026. A key difference is the arrival of 24/7 news and social media, which reframes both the telling, and the experience of a story. Aberfan in 1966 is a story told in black and white, spaced over time (Morris, 2016).

 

The challenge to define the inheritance of the citizen’s voices from Aberfan is real. Canning and Tombs cite Foucault on the power of language in their zemiological struggle (2021:117). Mindful of criminology’s interdisciplinary nature, Collingwood (Connelly & D’Oro, 2008:208-212) helps define this challenge in his distinction between the didactic historian who teaches us the truth about what happened, and the philosopher as poet who helps us experience what happened. Davies (1967) Inquiry Report is Collingwood’s historian. Before looking at the State, this essay invokes Siersema’s poets and musicians as Collingwood’s philosopher giving voice to Aberfan’s pain.

 

Johnes’ work shows that a “Labour Government, a Labour Council and a Labour Nationalised Coal Board” presided over the creation of the accident, the report of the event and the decisions about the consequences (Johnes, 2000:1). At no point did the State abdicate control. Though there were anomalies: The NCB enjoyed immunity from parliamentary control (HC 751:Col 1925). In-all-of this no one individual is blamed, and no one loses their job. Box’s (1983) analysis of “mystification” is pertinent to this point. Everyone is suitably appalled at what happened. Hansard’s record of the Parliamentary debate, and the ninety-thousand-pounds plus donations to the “Aberfan Disaster Fund”, are poignant testimony to that. As Box affirms Matza’s “concern for public order and safety… the state is vindicated” (1983:14).  Before looking at wider society, this essay asseverates both Matza and Box are vindicated at Aberfan.

 

The question stands how public inquiries engage with wider society. The Inquiries Act (2005) replaced the Tribunal Act (1921). McLean argued coherently, in written evidence to the Select Committee on Public Administration, that the 1921 Act was “not redundant” (2004: paragraph 13).  McLean noted that Davies Inquiry of 1967 was the longest and most detailed ever conducted under the 1921 Act. One of the reasons it was successful was Government’s specific decision to fund legal representation and travel costs for witnesses.  Research by the House of Commons Library (Public Inquiries, 2025) shows the comprehensive nature of the changes of the 2005 Act, with Ministers accruing additional powers and creating the framework for most future Inquiries to be statutory. The Act may have limited the right of Parliament to set up a public inquiry and transferred most of those powers to a Minister. The Research comments that the 1921 Act was “perceived to be inflexible” (2025:33). In theory the 2005 Act is an administrative improvement on the 1921 Act, but McLean’s legitimate reservations must be noted.

 

The Research Paper notes that since the 2005 Act there have been a series of House of Lords Committees that have critically reviewed the Act (2025:34-37) and its implementation. Notably in 2013 and again in 2024 – setting out recommendations, most of which have not been implemented. The Government has responded to the Committee’s 2024 Report noting that it will publish a review of the outstanding recommendations. One of the key points is the contention that non-statutory public inquiries are more likely to successfully engage with the public. A central inquiries unit in the Cabinet Office has been created to address the perception that public inquiries “reinvent the wheel” (2025:36), while failing to solve key problems. Before looking at lessons learned, this essay marks the complexity of the public inquiry, and that its damaged reputation potentially undermines public trust in an important democratic instrument.

 

Are lessons learned? On one level: yes. The Government, responding to the Davies Report (1967), accepted the recommendations and address two key concerns. They created a National Tip Safety Committee, and to address the legislative recommendations in the Report they passed the Mines & Quarries (Tips) Act 1969. McLean (2016) argues the long legacy from Aberfan must wait until 1974 for the Health & Safety at Work etc Act. The Institute of Civil Engineering has sought to capture the learning in its training (ICE, 2025).

McLean (2016) argued, cogently, there are at least ten lessons that can still be learned from Aberfan, from freedom of information requests to not letting government run quangos. Successive primary legislation has missed the opportunity to make the Charity Commission fully independent of Government with enhanced regulatory powers. They remain a “non-ministerial government department” (Charity Commission, 2025), while at the same time paradoxically claiming to be “independent” – an interesting re-interpretation of the word “independent”. In 1997 Rt Hon Ron Davies MP rightly reimbursed the £150K that was transferred from the Disaster Fund to resource tip repair work. It was not until 2007 that the National Assembly for Wales gave the Aberfan Memorial Charity £1.5M to recompense the lost value of the original transfer (McLean 2016).

 

Could Aberfan happen again? On the technical question of coal tip slides recurring, the answer is “no and yes”. No: because significant work has taken place, following Aberfan, on coal tip management across the UK. Yes: noting the challenges of climate change and, for example, the Government planning for flood zones (DEFRA, 2025) . Flow-slides were crucial in Aberfan in 1967: they remain so. Take, for example, theoretical modelling work on flow-slides (Qiao & Clayton, 2013). Real-world examples of landslides are evidenced at Hatfield Colliery in 2013 (British Geographical Survey, 2025).

 

Canning & Tombs’ (2021:177) zemiological discussion of Foucault’s analysis of the power of language is illustrated in the patriarchal execution of the public inquiry on Aberfan. Burnham’s call for a “duty of candour” in  the “Hillsborough Law” (Public Authority (Accountability) Bill, 2017) would have radically shortened that inquiry easing citizen’s pain. Though flawed, until a better vehicle is built, the public inquiry remains an important democratic institution for all citizens, especially of Aberfan.

 

 

October 2026

 

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